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Abstract
This paper provides an introductory review of the theory of judgment aggre-
gation. It introduces the paradoxes of majority voting that originally motivated
the ￿eld, explains several key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judg-
ment aggregation, presents a pedagogical proof of one of those results, discusses
escape routes from the impossibility and relates judgment aggregation to some other
salient aggregation problems, such as preference aggregation, abstract aggregation
and probability aggregation. The present illustrative rather than exhaustive review
is intended to give readers who are new to the ￿eld of judgment aggregation a sense
of this rapidly growing research area.
1 Introduction
The theory of judgment aggregation is a growing interdisciplinary research area in eco-
nomics, philosophy, political science, law and computer science. Its main research ques-
tion is the following: How can a group of individuals make consistent collective judgments
on a set of propositions on the basis of the group members￿individual judgments on them?
This problem lies at the heart of democratic decision making and arises in many di⁄erent
contexts, ranging from legislative committees to referenda, from expert panels to juries
and multi-member courts, from boards of companies to international organizations, from
families and informal social groups to societies at large. While each such real-world case
can be investigated in its own right, the theory of judgment aggregation looks at the
structural properties that di⁄erent judgment aggregation problems have in common, ab-
stracting from the details of individual cases. The aim of this paper is to provide an
introductory review of this theory.
The recent interest in judgment aggregation was sparked by the observation that
majority voting, the paradigmatic democratic aggregation rule, fails to guarantee con-
sistent collective judments whenever the decision problem in question exceeds a certain
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1level of complexity. This observation, now known as the discursive dilemma, generalizes
Condorcet￿ s classic paradox of voting from the 18th century. The problem of incon-
sistent majority judgments was subsequently shown to illustrate a deeper impossibility
result, of which the literature now contains several variants. The bottom line is that, for
a large class of decision problems, no aggregation rule guarantees consistent collective
judgments and satis￿es some other salient conditions exempli￿ed by majority voting,
most importantly the feature of propositionwise aggregation, i.e., determining the col-
lective judgment on each proposition as a function of individual judgments on it. The
di⁄erent variants of this impossibility result, in turn, allow us to identify how far we
need to deviate from majority voting, and thereby to modify conventional democratic
principles, in order to ￿nd workable solutions to judgment aggregation problems.
The theory of judgment aggregation has several di⁄erent intellectual origins.1 The
initial observation that motivated much of the current ￿eld had its origins in the area
of jurisprudence, in Kornhauser and Sager￿ s work on decision making in collegial courts
(Kornhauser and Sager 1986, 1993; Kornhauser 1992), but was given its present inter-
pretation ￿as a general problem of inconsistent majority judgments ￿by Pettit (2001),
Brennan (2001) and List and Pettit (2002). List and Pettit (2002, 2004) introduced a ￿rst
formal model of judgment aggregation, combining an axiomatic approach to the study of
aggregation rules, as common in social choice theory (going back to Arrow 1951/1963),
with a logical representation of propositions. Using this model, they proved a simple
impossibility theorem, which was strengthened and extended by several authors, begin-
ning with Pauly and van Hees (2006) and Dietrich (2006). Independently, Nehring and
Puppe (2002) proved some powerful results on the theory of strategy-proof social choice,
which turned out to have important corollaries for judgment aggregation (see Nehring and
Puppe 2010). Their key innovation was to characterize classes of decision problems for
which certain impossibility results hold, which inspired a sequence of subsequent results,
beginning with Dokow and Holzman (2010a), Dietrich and List (2007a) and others. A
very general extension of the model of judgment aggregation, from propositional logic to
any logic within a large class, was developed by Dietrich (2007a). The theory of judgment
aggregation is also related to the theories of abstract aggregation (Wilson 1975, Rubin-
stein and Fishburn 1986), belief merging in computer science (Konieczny and Pino PØrez
2002, see also Pigozzi 2006) and probability aggregation (e.g., McConway 1981, Genest
and Zidek 1986, Mongin 1995), and has informal precursors in the work of Guilbaud
(1966) on what he called the logical problem of aggregation and arguably in Condorcet￿ s
work itself. The relationship between preference aggregation in the tradition of Con-
dorcet and Arrow and judgment aggregation is discussed in List and Pettit (2004) and
Dietrich and List (2007a).
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2, I explain the problem of inconsistent
majority judgments, which sparked the interest in judgment aggregation. In section 3,
I introduce the basic formal model of judgment aggregation, which then, in section 4,
allows me to present some key results on the impossibility of propositionwise judgment
aggregation. In section 5, I ask how this impossibility can be avoided, reviewing several
possible escape routes. In section 6, I relate the theory of judgment aggregation to other
branches of aggregation theory. In section 7, ￿nally, I make some concluding remarks.
While a comprehensive survey of the theory of judgment aggregation is beyond the scope
1For further technical and philosophical surveys, see List and Puppe (2009) and List (2006), respec-
tively.
2of this paper, the present illustrative rather than exhaustive review of the ￿eld is intended
to introduce the theory in a succinct way, in light of the fact that the literature is now
so large that readers new to the area may ￿nd it hard to know where to start.
2 The problem of inconsistent majority judgments
It is instructive to begin with Kornhauser and Sager￿ s (1986) example from the area of
jurisprudence: the doctrinal paradox (the name was introduced in Kornhauser 1992). (In
fact, a similar example was already given by Vacca 1921, as recently observed by Spector
2009.) Suppose a collegial court consisting of three judges has to reach a verdict in a
breach-of-contract case. There are three propositions on which the court is required to
make judgments:
p: The defendant was contractually obliged not to do a particular action.
q: The defendant did that action.
r: The defendant is liable for breach of contract.
According to legal doctrine, propositions p and q are jointly necessary and su¢ cient for
proposition r. Suppose now that the three judges disagree about the case, as shown in
Table 1. The ￿rst thinks that p and q are both true, and hence that r is true as well.
The second thinks that p is true but q is false, and consequently that r is also false. The
third thinks that while q is true, p is false, and so r is false too. What does the court as
a whole think?
p q r
Judge 1 True True True
Judge 2 True False False
Judge 3 False True False
Majority True True False
Table 1: A doctrinal paradox
If the three judges take a majority vote on proposition r ￿ the conclusion ￿ the
outcome is its rejection: a ￿ not liable￿verdict. But if they take majority votes on each
of p and q instead ￿the premises ￿then both of these propositions are accepted and
hence the background legal doctrine dictates that r should be accepted as well: a ￿ liable￿
verdict. The court￿ s decision thus depends on the aggregation rule used. Under the ￿rst of
these two approaches, the conclusion-based rule, the court will reach a ￿ not liable￿verdict;
under the second, the premise-based rule, it will reach a ￿ liable￿verdict. Kornhauser and
Sager￿ s doctrinal paradox (like Vacca￿ s 1921 observation) consists in the fact that the
premise-based and conclusion-based rules can produce opposite outcomes for the same
combination of individual judgments.2
However, the example also illustrates a more general point, not made explicit in
Kornhauser and Sager￿ s (or Vacca￿ s) analysis. Relative to the given legal doctrine ￿which
states that r is true if and only if both p and q are true ￿the majority judgments across the
2For recent discussions of the doctrinal paradox, see Kornhauser and Sager (2004) and List and Pettit
(2005).
3three propositions are inconsistent. In precise terms, the set of propositions accepted by a
majority, namely fp;q;:rg, is logically inconsistent relative to the constraint r $ (p^q).
This problem generalizes well beyond this example and does not depend on the presence
of any legal doctrine or other exogenous constraint; nor does it depend on any criterion
for partitioning the relevant set of propositions into premises and conclusions.
To illustrate the more general problem, consider any set of propositions with some
non-trivial logical connections; below I say more about the precise kinds of logical con-
nections required. Take, for instance, the following three propositions on which a multi-
member government may seek to make collective judgments:
p: We can a⁄ord a budget de￿cit.
p ! q: If we can a⁄ord a budget de￿cit, then we should increase
spending on health care.
q: We should increase spending on health care.
Suppose now that individual judgments are as shown in Table 2. One third of the
individuals accept all three propositions; a second third accept p but reject p ! q and q,
accepting :(p ! q) and :q instead; and the last third accept p ! q but reject p and q,
accepting :p and :q instead.
p p ! q q
1/3 of individuals True True True
1/3 of individuals True False False
1/3 of individuals False True False
Majority True True False
Table 2: A problem of inconsistent majority judgments
Then each individual holds consistent judgments on the three propositions, and yet
there are majorities for p, for p ! q and for :q, a logically inconsistent set of propositions.
The fact that majority voting may generate inconsistent collective judgments is often
called the discursive dilemma (Pettit 2001, List and Pettit 2002; see also Brennan 2001).
The problem is very general:
Remark 1. Inconsistent majority judgments can arise as soon as the set of
propositions and their negations on which judgments are to be made exhibits
a simple combinatorial property (Dietrich and List 2007b, Nehring and Puppe
2007): it has a minimally inconsistent subset of three or more propositions,
where a set of propositions is called minimally inconsistent if it is inconsistent
and every proper subset of it is consistent.
In the court example, a minimally inconsistent set with these properties is fp, q, :rg,
where the inconsistency is relative to the constraint r $ (p ^ q). In the government
example, it is fp, p ! q, :qg. It is easy to see that, as soon as there exists at least
one minimally inconsistent subset of three or more propositions among the proposition-
negation pairs under consideration, one can always construct combinations of judgments
such as the one in Table 2 and hence arrive at inconsistent majority judgments. As
4explained in section 6 below, Condorcet￿ s classic paradox of cyclical majority prefer-
ences is an instance of this general phenomenon, which Guilbaud (1966) described as the
Condorcet e⁄ect.
3 The logic-based model of judgment aggregation
In order to go beyond the observation that majority voting may yield inconsistent col-
lective judgments and to ask whether other aggregation rules may be immune to this
problem, it is necessary to introduce a more general model, which abstracts from the
speci￿c decision problem and aggregation rule in question. The model to be presented
follows the formalism introduced in List and Pettit (2002) and extended beyond standard
propositional logic by Dietrich (2007a).
Consider a ￿nite set N = f1;2;:::;ng (with n ￿ 2) of individuals, who have to
make judgments on some propositions.3 Propositions are represented by sentences from
propositional logic or a more expressive logical language and are denoted p, q, r and so
on. Propositional logic can express atomic propositions, which do not contain any logical
connectives, such as the proposition that we can a⁄ord a budget de￿cit or the proposition
that spending on health care should be increased, as well as compound propositions, with
the logical connectives : (￿ not￿ ), ^ (￿ and￿ ), _ (￿ or￿ ), ! (￿ if-then￿ ), $ (￿ if and only if￿ ),
such as the proposition that if we can a⁄ord a budget de￿cit, then spending on health
care should be increased. Instead of propositional logic, any logic with some minimal
properties can be used, including expressively richer logics such as predicate, modal,
deontic and conditional logics (Dietrich 2007a). Generally, a logic for the present purposes
is a non-empty set L of sentences (called propositions) that is endowed with a negation
operator : (￿ not￿ ) and a notion of consistency, subject to some standard conditions.4 In
standard propositional logic, a set of propositions is consistent if all its members can be
simultaneously true. Thus the setfp, q, p ^ qg is consistent while the sets fp, p ! q,
:qg and fp, :pg are not. We say that a set S ￿ L logically entails a proposition p 2 L,
written S ‘ p, if S [ f:pg is inconsistent. The set fp;qg, for example, logically entails
the proposition p ^ q.
The set of propositions on which judgments are to be made in a particular decision
problem is called the agenda. Formally, the agenda is de￿ned as a non-empty subset
X ￿ L that is closed under negation, i.e., if p 2 X, then :p 2 X.5 In the government
example, the agenda is
X = fp;:p;p ! q;:(p ! q);q;:qg:
In the court example, it is
X = fp;:p;q;:q;r;:rg;
3The agenda characterization results discussed below require n ￿ 3.
4Every proposition-negation pair fp;:pg ￿ L is inconsistent. Subsets of consistent sets S ￿ L are
consistent. The empty set ; is consistent, and every consistent set S ￿ L has a consistent superset T ￿ L
containing a member of each proposition-negation pair fp;:pg ￿ L. See Dietrich (2007a).
5For some formal results, it is necessary to exclude tautologies and contradictions from the agenda, i.e.,
to assume that each of f:pg and fpg is consistent for every p 2 X. Further, some results simplify when
the agenda is assumed to be ￿nite. In order to avoid such technicalities, I here make both simplifying
assumptions. To render ￿niteness compatible with negation-closure, I assume that double negations
cancel each other out; more elaborate constructions can be given.
5but here there is an additional stipulation built into the logic requiring that r $ (p^q).6
Now each individual￿ s judgment set is the set of propositions that this individual
accepts. Formally, a judgment set is a subset J ￿ X. On the standard interpretation,
to accept a proposition means to believe it to be true; on an alternative interpretation,
it could mean to desire it to be true. For the present purposes, it is easiest to adopt the
standard interpretation, i.e., to interpret judgments as binary cognitive attitudes rather
than as binary emotive ones. A judgment set is called consistent if it is a consistent set
of propositions in the standard sense of the logic, and complete if it contains a member
of each proposition-negation pair in X. A combination of judgment sets across the
individuals in N, (J1;:::;Jn) is called a pro￿le. Thus the ￿rst three rows of Tables 1 and
2 show examples of pro￿les on the agendas in question.
To complete the exposition of the model, it remains to de￿ne the notion of an ag-
gregation rule. An aggregation rule is a function F that maps each pro￿le of individual
judgment sets (J1;:::;Jn) in some domain to a collective judgment set J = F(J1;:::;Jn),
interpreted as the set of propositions accepted by the group N as a whole. Examples of
aggregation rules are:
￿ majority voting, as already introduced, where each proposition is collectively ac-
cepted if and only if it is accepted by a majority of individuals, i.e.,
F(J1;:::;Jn) = fp 2 X : jfi 2 N : p 2 Jigj > n=2g;
￿ supermajority or unanimity rules, where each proposition is collectively accepted
if and only if it is accepted by a certain quali￿ed majority of individuals, such as
two thirds, three quarters, or all of them, i.e.,
F(J1;:::;Jn) = fp 2 X : jfi 2 N : p 2 Jigj ￿ nqg, where q 2 (
1
2
;1];
￿ dictatorships, where the collective judgment set is always the individual judgment
set of some antecedently ￿xed individual, i.e.,
F(J1;:::;Jn) = Ji for some ￿xed i 2 N;
￿ inverse dictatorships, where the collective judgment set is always ￿rather perversely
￿the propositionwise negation of the individual judgment set of some antecedently
￿xed individual, i.e.,
F(J1;:::;Jn) = f:p : p 2 Jig for some ￿xed i 2 N;
￿ premise-based rules, as brie￿ y introduced in the court example above, where the
set of collectively accepted propositions is given by applying majority voting (or
some other propositionwise criterion) on some privileged subset of propositions (the
premises) and then taking the logical closure of the resulting judgments, e.g.,
F(J1;:::;Jn) = fp 2 X : G(J1;:::;Jn) \ Y ‘ pg;
where G(J1;:::;Jn)\Y is the set of majority-accepted propositions (or those picked
out by another designated criterion G) among the ones in the privileged subset
Y ￿ X;
6Formally, a set of propositions S is deemed to be consistent in this augmented logic if and only if
S [ fr $ (p ^ q)g is consistent in the standard sense of propositional logic. For the full details of this
construction, see Dietrich and List (2008d).
6￿ conclusion-based rules, also mentioned above, where the set of collectively accepted
propositions is given by applying majority voting (or some other criterion) on some
privileged subset of propositions (the conclusions) but not taking the logical closure
of the resulting judgments, e.g.,
F(J1;:::;Jn) = G(J1;:::;Jn) \ Z;
with G(J1;:::;Jn) as just de￿ned and Z ￿ X being the privileged subset.
Although there is an abundance of logically possible aggregation rules, it is surpris-
ingly di¢ cult to ￿nd compelling rules that guarantee consistent collective judgments.
As we have already seen, majority voting notoriously fails to do the job as soon as the
propositions in X exhibit some relatively simple logical connections (i.e., X has a mini-
mally inconsistent subset of three or more propositions). Let me therefore turn to a more
general, axiomatic investigation of possible aggregation rules.
4 The impossibility of propositionwise aggregation
Are there any democratically plausible aggregation rules that guarantee consistent col-
lective judgments? The answer to this question depends on two factors:
￿ the types of agendas for which we want to employ such an aggregation rule; and
￿ the conditions that we expect the aggregation rule to satisfy.
Before presenting some illustrative results, let me brie￿ y explain in very simple terms
why both factors matter. Suppose, for example, we wish to make only a single binary
judgment, say on whether to accept p or :p, i.e., the agenda contains only a single
proposition-negation pair (or perhaps multiple unconnected such pairs). Obviously, we
can then use majority voting without the risk of collective inconsistency. On the other
hand, if the agenda has a minimally inconsistent subset of three or more propositions,
majority voting runs into di¢ culties, as illustrated above. These simple considerations
highlight that the complexity of the agenda is of crucial relevance to the question of
which aggregation rules, if any, produce consistent collective judgments.
Secondly, suppose that, instead of using an aggregation rule that satis￿es strong
democratic principles, we content ourselves with installing a dictatorship, i.e., we appoint
one individual whose judgments are deemed always to determine the collective ones. If
this individual￿ s judgments are consistent, then, trivially, so are the resulting collective
judgments. The problem of aggregation will have been resolved under such a dictatorial
arrangement, albeit in a degenerate and unappealing way. By contrast, if we demand
democratic responsiveness of collective judgments to individual ones and interpret this
in terms of majority voting, we can run into problems, as we have already seen. This
illustrates that the answer to the question of whether there exist any aggregation rules
that ensure consistent collective judgments depends very much on the conditions we
expect those rules to meet.
4.1 A simple impossibility
With these preliminary remarks in place, we are in a position to address the question of
the existence of compelling aggregation rules in more detail. The impossibility theorem
7in List and Pettit (2002) gives a simple answer to this question for a speci￿c class of
agendas and a speci￿c set of conditions on the aggregation rule. The agendas in question
are those that contain at least two distinct atomic propositions (say, p, q) and either their
conjunction (p ^ q), or their disjunction (p _ q), or their material implication (p ! q).
There are four conditions on the aggregation rule: one input condition, one output condi-
tion and two responsiveness conditions. The ￿rst condition requires the aggregation rule
to accept as admissible input every possible pro￿le of fully rational individual judgment
sets.
Universal domain. The domain of F is the set of all possible pro￿les of
consistent and complete (￿ fully rational￿ ) individual judgment sets on X.
The second condition constrains the outputs of the aggregation rule, requiring it to
produce a fully rational collective judgment set for every admissible pro￿le of individual
judgment sets.
Collective rationality. For any pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn) in the domain of F,
F(J1;:::;Jn) is a consistent and complete collective judgment set on X.
The third and fourth conditions constrain the way the outputs are generated from the
inputs and can thus be seen as responsiveness conditions. We begin with systematicity.
Systematicity. For any two pro￿les (J1;:::;Jn), (J0
1;:::;J0
n) in the domain of
F and any two propositions p;q 2 X,
[p 2 Ji , q 2 J0
i for all i 2 N] ) [p 2 F(J1;:::;Jn) , q 2 F(J0
1;:::;J0
n)]:
Informally, this can also be expressed as the requirement that (i) the collective judg-
ment on each proposition in X depend only on individual judgments on that proposition,
not on individual judgments on other propositions (the independence part), and (ii) the
criterion for determining the collective judgment on each proposition be the same across
all propositions in X (the neutrality part). The next responsiveness condition requires
that all individuals be given equal weight in the aggregation.
Anonymity. For any two pro￿les (J1;:::;Jn), (J0
1;:::;J0
n) in the domain of F
which are permutations of each other, F(J1;:::;Jn) = F(J0
1;:::;J0
n).
Much can be said about these conditions ￿I discuss them further in the section on how
to avoid the impossibility ￿but for the moment it is enough to note that they are inspired
by key properties of majority voting. One can easily check that majority voting satis￿es
all of them, with the crucial exception of the consistency part of collective rationality
(except for trivial agendas), as shown by the discursive dilemma. The following theorem
establishes that majority voting is not alone in failing to satisfy the four conditions
together.
Theorem 1. Let X ￿ fp;q;p^qg (where p^q can also be replaced by p_q
or p ! q). Then there exists no aggregation rule satisfying universal domain,
collective rationality, systematicity and anonymity (List and Pettit 2002).
The proof is fairly simple, but is omitted here due to space constraints; interested
readers are referred to the original paper.
84.2 The impossibility generalized
As mentioned in the introduction, this impossibility result has been signi￿cantly gener-
alized and extended in a growing literature. Di⁄erent impossibility theorems apply to
di⁄erent classes of agendas, and they impose di⁄erent conditions on the aggregation rule.
However:
Remark 2. Di⁄erent impossibility theorems share a generic form, which
can be summarized roughly as follows: For a particular class of agendas, the
aggregation rules satisfying a particular combination of input, output and
responsiveness conditions are either non-existent or otherwise degenerate.
The precise class of agendas and input, output and responsiveness conditions vary
from result to result. For example, Pauly and van Hees￿ s (2006) ￿rst theorem states that if
we take the same class of agendas as in List and Pettit￿ s theorem and the same input and
output conditions (universal domain and collective rationality), keep the responsiveness
condition of systematicity but drop anonymity, then we are left only with dictatorial
aggregation rules, as de￿ned above.
Other theorems by Pauly and van Hees (2006) and Dietrich (2006) show that, for more
restrictive classes of agendas (so-called atomically closed and atomic ones, respectively),
again with the original input and output conditions and without anonymity, but this time
with systematicity weakened to its ￿rst part (independence), we are still left only with
dictatorial or constant aggregation rules. The latter are another kind of degenerate rules,
which assign to every pro￿le the same ￿xed collective judgment set, paying no attention
to any of the individual judgment sets.
Another theorem, by Mongin (2008), also keeps the original input and output con-
ditions, adds a further responsiveness condition requiring that any proposition p 2 X
accepted by all individuals be collectively accepted, but weakens systematicity further,
namely to an independence condition restricted to atomic propositions alone. The the-
orem then shows that, for a certain class of agendas, only dictatorial aggregation rules
satisfy these conditions together. Later I also comment on some impossibility results
that modify the input and output conditions introduced above.
4.3 Characterizations of impossibility agendas
The most general theorems in the literature on judgment aggregation are what we may
call agenda characterization theorems:
Remark 3. Agenda characterization theorems do not merely show that
for a certain class of agendas, a certain combination of input, output and
responsiveness conditions leads to an empty or degenerate class of aggregation
rules, but they fully characterize those agendas for which this is the case and,
by implication, those for which it is not.
The underlying idea was introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2002) in the di⁄erent
context of strategy-proof social choice, but several of their results carry over to judgment
aggregation, as discussed in Nehring and Puppe (2010), and have inspired a sequence
9of subsequent agenda characterization results (e.g., Dokow and Holzman 2010a, Dietrich
and List 2007a).
To give a ￿ avour of these results, recall that only agendas with at least one minimally
inconsistent subset of three or more propositions are of interest from the perspective of
impossibility theorems; call such agendas non-simple. For agendas below this level of
complexity, majority voting works perfectly well.7 Non-simple agendas may or may not
have some additional properties. For example, they may or may not have a minimally in-
consistent subset with the special property that, by negating some even number of propo-
sitions in it, it becomes consistent; call an agenda of this kind even-number-negatable.8
The agendas in our two examples above ￿the court and government examples ￿have
both of these properties. In each case, the agenda has a minimally inconsistent subset
of three propositions, and in that same subset one can ￿nd two propositions (i.e., an
even number) whose negation renders the subset consistent: p and :q in the case of fp,
p ! q, :qg in the government example, and p and q in the case of fp;q;:rg in the court
example, subject to the constraint r $ (p ^ q). Both properties ￿non-simplicity and
even-number-negatability ￿are relatively undemanding, and only very restrictive kinds
of agendas violate them.9 Yet, going back to the original conditions of Theorem 1, with
anonymity dropped, the following pair of results turns out to hold.
Theorem 2.
(a) If (and only if) the agenda is non-simple and even-number-negatable,
every aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality and
systematicity is a dictatorship or inverse dictatorship (Dietrich and List 2007a).
(b) If (and only if) the agenda is non-simple (whether or not it is even-
number-negatable), every aggregation rule satisfying the same conditions and
in addition monotonicity is a dictatorship (Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2010).
Monotonicity is the following natural requirement, also exempli￿ed by majority vot-
ing:
Monotonicity. If a proposition p 2 X is collectively accepted for a given
pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn) and we consider another pro￿le (J1;:::;J0
i;:::;Jn) in which
an additional individual i accepts p (i.e., p 2 J0
i whereas p = 2 Ji) while all other
individuals￿judgment sets are as before, then p is also collectively accepted
for the second pro￿le.
If we introduce an additional restriction on the agenda, then a similar pair of results
holds with systematicity weakened to independence and an additional responsiveness
condition of unanimity preservation. Call an agenda totally blocked (also called path-
connected) if any proposition contained in it can be ￿ reached￿ from any other via a
7The majority judgments are then consistent and in the absence of ties also complete.
8This property was introduced by Dietrich (2007a) and Dietrich and List (2007a). A logically equiv-
alent property is the algebraic property of non-a¢ neness introduced by Dokow and Holzman (2010a),
which requires that the admissible set of 0/1-truth-evaluations across the propositions in X should not
be an a¢ ne subspace of f0;1g
jXj
2 , where
jXj
2 is the total number of proposition-negation pairs in X.
9Non-simplicity is only violated if the logical interconnections in X do not go beyond pairs of propo-
sitions. Even-number-negatability is only violated if X is isomorphic to a set of propositions in standard
propositional logic whose only logical connectives are : and $ (Dokow and Holzman 2010a).
10sequence of pairwise logical entailments conditional on other propositions in the agenda
(Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2010). Formally, p 2 X conditionally entails q 2 X, written
p ‘￿ q, if there exists a subset Y ￿ X consistent with each of p and :q such that
fpg[Y ‘ q. The agenda X is totally blocked if, for any p;q 2 X, there exists a sequence
of propositions p1,...,pk 2 X such that p=p1 ‘￿ p2 ‘￿ ::: ‘￿ pk=q. Any agenda with
this property is automatically non-simple, as de￿ned above. The following pair of results
holds.
Theorem 3.
(a) If (and only if) the agenda is totally blocked and even-number-negatable,
every aggregation rule satisfying universal domain, collective rationality, inde-
pendence and unanimity preservation is a dictatorship (Dokow and Holzman
2010a; the ￿ if￿ -part was also proved in Dietrich and List 2007a).
(b) If (and only if) the agenda is totally blocked (whether or not it is even-
number-negatable), every aggregation rule satisfying the same conditions and
in addition monotonicity is a dictatorship (Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2010).
Unanimity preservation can be formally stated as follows; again, it is satis￿ed by
majority voting.
Unanimity preservation. For any admissible unanimous pro￿le (J;:::;J),
F(J;:::;J) = J.
Table 3 summarizes the four agenda characterization results stated in this subsection.
Class of
agendas
Input Output Resp￿ ness
Resulting
agg. rules
Non-simple
Even-numb.-neg.
Univ. domain Coll. rationality Systematicity
Dictatorships
Inv. dict￿ ships
(Theorem 2a)
Non-simple Univ. domain Coll. rationality
Systematicity
Monotonicity
Dictatorships
(Theorem 2b)
Totally blocked
Even-numb.-neg.
Univ. domain Coll. rationality
Independence
Unan. preserv.
Dictatorships
(Theorem 3a)
Totally blocked Univ. domain Coll. rationality
Independence
Monotonicity
Unan. preserv.
Dictatorships
(Theorem 3b)
Table 3: Agenda characterization results
For each row of the table, the following two things are true: ￿rst, if the agenda has
the property indicated in the left-most column, every aggregation rule satisfying the
speci￿ed input, output and responsiveness conditions is of the kind stated in the right-
most column; and second, if the agenda violates the property in the left-most column,
11there exist aggregation rules other than those stated in the right-most column which still
satisfy the speci￿ed conditions.
In the next subsection, I give a pedagogical sketch proof of the impossibility (￿ if￿ )
part of Theorem 3a, from which the impossibility parts of Theorems 2a,b and 3b can, in
turn, be derived. The proof to be presented draws on Dietrich and List (2007a). Less
technically inclined readers may skip that subsection without losing the general thread
of the discussion.
4.4 A sketch proof
Suppose X is totally blocked and even-number-negatable, and F satis￿es the conditions
of Theorem 3a, i.e., universal domain, collective rationality, independence, and unanimity
preservation. We want to show that F must be a dictatorship of one individual.
Since F satis￿es independence, the question of whether any proposition p 2 X is
collectively accepted for any given pro￿le depends only on the individual judgments on
p, not on individual judgments on other propositions. In particular, some combinations
of individual judgments on p lead to the collective acceptance of p, others to its rejection.
We call a set of individuals C ￿ N a winning coalition for p if every pro￿le in which all
the individuals in C accept p while all others reject p leads to the collective acceptance of
p. We write Cp to denote the set of all winning coalitions for p. For each p 2 X, the set
Cp fully encodes the functional relationship between individual and collective judgments
on p. Thus the aggregation rule F can be represented as follows. For any admissible
pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn),
F(J1;:::;Jn) = fp 2 X : fi 2 N : p 2 Jig 2 Cpg,
i.e., the set of collectively accepted propositions consists of every proposition that is
accepted by a winning coalition for it. Using this insight, the argument that, under the
conditions of Theorem 3a, F is a dictatorship of one individual proceeds in ￿ve steps,
which successively constrain the properties of the sets of winning coalitions Cp across the
propositions in X.
Claim 1. If a proposition p 2 X conditionally entails another proposition
q 2 X, then every winning coalition for p is also a winning coalition for q.
Thus, if p ‘￿ q, then Cp ￿ Cq.
To show this, suppose p ‘￿ q and C ￿ N is a winning coalition for p. Since p ‘￿ q,
there exists a subset Y ￿ X consistent with each of p and :q such that fpg [ Y ‘
q. Now one can construct an admissible pro￿le within the universal domain in which
the individuals in C accept all propositions in fp;qg [ Y (which can be veri￿ed to be
consistent) and the individuals in NnC accept all propositions in f:p;:qg[Y (which can
also be veri￿ed to be consistent). Since all individuals in N accept all the propositions
in Y , and N is a winning coalition for each such proposition (by unanimity preservation,
together with independence), all propositions in Y are collectively accepted. Since C is a
winning coalition for p, p is collectively accepted as well. But since fpg[Y ‘ q, collective
rationality requires q to be collectively accepted too (if it is not, then by completeness :q
must be accepted and the collective judgments will be inconsistent). Therefore C must
be a winning coalition for q as well.
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p 2 X, and thus F can be represented in terms of a single set of winning
coalitions C.
Given claim 1, claim 2 follows immediately from the total blockedness of X. For any
p;q 2 X, we can ￿nd a sequence of propositions p1,...,pk 2 X such that p=p1 ‘￿ p2 ‘￿
::: ‘￿ pk=q, and hence Cp=Cp1 ￿ Cp2::: ￿ Cpk=Cq, by claim 1. But we can also ￿nd
a similar sequence that takes us from q to p, and hence Cq ￿ Cp. Therefore Cp = Cq.
From now on, we can write C to denote the universal set of winning coalitions for all
propositions, dropping the proposition-speci￿c subscript p.
Claim 3. If C is a winning coalition, then so is any superset of C. Thus C is
superset-closed.
Let C 2 C, and consider any C￿ ￿ C. Since X is even-number-negatable, it has
a minimally inconsistent subset Y with the special property that there exists a subset
Z ￿ Y of even size such that (Y nZ) [ f:p : p 2 Zg is consistent. Without loss of
generality, it can be assumed that Z has precisely two members (for reasons of space, I
omit the argument why this is no loss of generality). So let Z = fp;qg. Since the sets
(Y nfqg) [ f:qg,
(Y nfp;qg) [ f:p;:qg,
(Y nfpg) [ f:pg
are each consistent (the ￿rst and third by the minimal inconsistency of Y , and the second
by even-number-negatability), one can construct an admissible pro￿le in the universal
domain in which the individuals in C accept all the propositions in the ￿rst set, the
individuals in C￿nC accept all the propositions in the second set, and the rest, i.e., those
in NnC￿, accept all the propositions in the third set. The restriction of this pro￿le to the
relevant propositions is represented in Table 4.
p q
all propositions
in Y nfp;qg
Group 1: C true false true
Group 2: C￿nC false false true
Group 3: NnC￿ false true true
Table 4: A pro￿le (displayed only for the relevant propositions)
Since p is accepted precisely by the individuals in C and C is a winning coalition,
p is collectively accepted. Further, since the propositions in Y nfp;qg are all accepted
by all individuals and N is a winning coalition, they are all collectively accepted. But
now, since Y is minimally inconsistent, collective rationality implies that :q must be
collectively accepted too (if it is not, then by completeness q must be accepted and the
collective judgments will be inconsistent). But since :q is accepted precisely by the
individuals in C￿ (i.e., those in C [ (C￿nC)), this set must be a winning coalition, i.e.,
in C.
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winning coalition. Thus C is intersection-closed.
Let C1;C2 2 C. By the non-simplicity of the agenda (which can be shown to be
implied by its total blockedness), there exists a minimally inconsistent subset Y ￿ X
containing three or more propositions. Let p;q;r be three distinct propositions in Y .
Since the sets
(Y nfrg) [ f:rg,
(Y nfqg) [ f:qg,
(Y nfpg) [ f:pg
are each consistent, one can construct an admissible pro￿le in the universal domain in
which the individuals in C1\C2 accept all the propositions in the ￿rst set, the individuals
in C1nC2 accept all the propositions in the second set, and all others, i.e., those in NnC1,
accept all the propositions in the third set. The restriction of the pro￿le to the relevant
propositions is represented in Table 5.
p q r
all propositions
in Y nfp;q;rg
Group 1: C1 \ C2 true true false true
Group 2: C1nC2 true false true true
Group 3: NnC1 (￿ C2nC1) false true true true
Table 5: A pro￿le (displayed only for the relevant propositions)
Since p is accepted precisely by the individuals in C1 (everyone in (C1\C2)[(C1nC2))
and C1 is a winning coalition, p is collectively accepted. Further, since q is accepted by the
individuals in a superset of the winning coalition C2 (namely everyone in (NnC1)[(C1\
C2)) and supersets of winning coalitions are themselves winning coalitions (by claim 3),
q is also collectively accepted. Finally, since the propositions in Y nfp;q;rg are accepted
by all individuals and N is a winning coalition, they are also collectively accepted. But
now, since Y is minimally inconsistent, collective rationality will be violated unless :r
is collectively accepted (if it is not, then by completeness r must be accepted and the
collective judgments will be inconsistent). But since :r is accepted precisely by the
individuals in C1 \ C2, this set must be a winning coalition, i.e., in C.
Claim 5. There exists a single individual i (a ￿ dictator￿ ) such that, for any
C ￿ N, C 2 C if and only if i 2 C. Thus F is a dictatorship.
By claim 4, the intersection of all winning coalitions is a winning coalition. Moreover,
this intersection must be non-empty since, as noted, N is a winning coalition and thus
the empty set cannot be a winning coalition (otherwise we would run into violations
of collective rationality). Hence there exists an individual i who is a member of every
winning coalition C 2 C. Now suppose, for a contradiction, that there exists a set C ￿ N
that contains individual i but is not a winning coalition. In order to avoid violations
of the completeness part of collective rationality, the complement of C, i.e., NnC, must
then be a winning coalition (otherwise the simultaneous rejection of a proposition and
14its negation becomes possible). But this complement does not contain individual i,
which contradicts the earlier observation that individual i is a member of every winning
coalition. This completes the proof of the impossibility part of Theorem 3a. ￿
For the possibility (￿ only if￿ ) part of Theorem 3a, a proof of which I omit here, we
need to show that, for any agenda X that violates total blockedness or even-number-
negatability, one can construct an aggregation rule F satisfying the speci￿ed conditions.
The reader is referred to Dokow and Holzman (2010a) and Nehring and Puppe (2002,
2010) for explicit constructions.
It remains to explain how we can derive proofs of the impossibility (￿ if￿ ) parts of
Theorems 2a,b and 3b from the present proof. Since the proof I have sketched is quite
￿ modular￿ , each of these other proofs can be obtained simply by dropping a suitable
module. Let me go through each case.
￿ Theorem 3b imposes the additional condition of monotonicity on F. Claim 3 there-
fore follows immediately from the monotonicity of F and does not need to be de-
rived from other assumptions. Consequently, it is no longer necessary to invoke
the agenda condition of even-number-negatability, which is used only in the argu-
ment for claim 3. The proof now goes through under the agenda condition of total
blockedness alone.
￿ Theorem 2a imposes the condition of systematicity, not just independence, on F.
Claim 2 therefore follows immediately from the neutrality part of systematicity,
without any further argument, and claim 1 becomes redundant. In consequence, the
agenda condition of total blockedness is no longer needed and can be weakened to
non-simplicity alone. The rest of the proof still works as before. Strictly speaking,
this yields a variant of Theorem 2a with the additional condition of unanimity
preservation, which excludes inverse dictatorships (the joint characterization of
dictatorships and inverse dictatorships requires some additional steps).
￿ Theorem 2b imposes both systematicity and monotonicity on F. As a result, the
derivations of claims 1, 2 and 3 ￿and with them the agenda conditions of total
blockedness and even-number-negatability ￿can be dropped. The rest of the proof
goes through under the agenda condition of non-simplicity alone.
Later, I revisit the proof one more time, in connection with an impossibility result
that relaxes the condition of collective rationality, showing that the basic argument can
also be adjusted to apply to that case.
5 Avoiding the impossibility
The theorems reviewed in the last section show that:
Remark 4. If (i) we deal with decision problems in which the agenda ex-
hibits some of the identi￿ed properties and (ii) we consider the speci￿ed in-
put, output and responsiveness conditions to be indispensable requirements
of democratic aggregation, then judgment aggregation problems have no non-
degenerate solutions.
To avoid such a negative implication, we must therefore deny either (i) or (ii). Unless
we can somehow avoid non-trivial decision problems altogether, denying (i) does not seem
15to be a viable option. Therefore we must deny (ii). So what options do we have? For
each of the three types of conditions on an aggregation rule that have been introduced,
we can ask whether a suitable relaxation would enable us to avoid the impossibility.
5.1 Relaxing the input conditions
The impossibility theorems reviewed in the previous section all impose the condition of
universal domain on the aggregation rule, by which any possible pro￿le of consistent
and complete individual judgment sets on the propositions in X is deemed admissible as
input to the aggregation. At ￿rst sight, this condition seems very reasonable, since we
want the aggregation rule to cope with all possible inputs that may be submitted to it.
However, di⁄erent groups may exhibit di⁄erent levels of pluralism, and in some groups
there may be more agreement between the members￿judgments than in others. Expert
panels or ideologically well structured societies may be more homogeneous than large and
internally diverse electorates, for example. Thus the pro￿les of individual judgment sets
leading to collective inconsistencies under plausible aggregation rules such as majority
voting may be more likely to occur in heterogeneous groups than in more homogeneous
ones. Can we say something about the kind of homogeneity that is required for the
avoidance of majority inconsistencies ￿and by implication for the avoidance of the more
general impossibility results presented?
It turns out that there exist several combinatorial conditions with the property that,
on the restricted domain of pro￿les of individual judgment sets satisfying those conditions,
majority voting generates consistent and (absent ties) complete individual judgment sets.
Of course, majority voting also satis￿es the various responsiveness conditions introduced
in the last section. Given space constraints, I can here discuss only two illustrative such
conditions: a very simple one and a very general one.
The ￿rst condition, called unidimensional alignment (List 2003), is similar in spirit,
but not equivalent, to the classic condition of single-peakedness in the theory of preference
aggregation, which was introduced by Black (1948). (Single-peakedness is a constraint
on pro￿les of preference orderings rather than on pro￿les of judgment sets.) A pro￿le
(J1;:::;Jn) is unidimensionally aligned if the individuals in N can be aligned from left to
right such that, for every proposition p 2 X, the individuals accepting p (i.e., those in
fi 2 N : p 2 Jig) are either all to the left, or all to the right, of those rejecting p (i.e.,
those in fi 2 N : p = 2 Jig), as illustrated in Table 6.
Ind. 1 Ind. 2 Ind. 3 Ind. 4 Ind. 5
p True False False False False
p ! q False True True True True
q False False False True True
Table 6: A unidimensionally aligned pro￿le of individual judgment sets
The relevant left-right alignment of the individuals may be interpreted as capturing
their position on some cognitive or ideological dimension (e.g., from socio-economic left
to right, or from urban to rural, or from secular to religious, or from risk-averse to risk-
taking etc.), but what matters from the perspective of achieving majority consistency is
not the semantic interpretation of the alignment but rather the combinatorial constraint
it imposes on individual judgments.
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the individuals accepting each proposition are opposite those rejecting it on the given
left-right alignment, a proposition cannot be accepted by a majority unless it is accepted
by the middle individual on that alignment10 ￿ individual 3 in the example of Table
6. In particular, the majority judgments must coincide with the middle individual￿ s
judgments.11 Hence, assuming that the middle individual holds consistent judgments,
the resulting majority judgments will be consistent too.12 When restricted to the domain
of unidimensionally aligned pro￿les of consistent and complete individual judgment sets,
majority voting therefore satis￿es all the conditions introduced in the last section, except
of course universal domain.
However, while unidimensional alignment is su¢ cient for majority consistency, it is
not necessary. A necessary and su¢ cient condition is the following (Dietrich and List
2010a). A pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn) is called majority consistent if every minimally inconsistent
subset Y ￿ X contains at least one proposition p 2 Y that is not accepted by a majority,
i.e., for which jfi 2 N : p 2 Jigj ￿ n
2. It is easy to see that this is enough to ensure
consistent majority judgments. Suppose the set of propositions accepted by a majority,
i.e., J = F(J1;:::;Jn) (where F is majority voting), is inconsistent. Then J must have at
least one minimally inconsistent subset Y ￿ J. But if the pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn) satis￿es the
combinatorial condition just de￿ned, then at least one proposition p 2 Y is not accepted
by a majority, contradicting the assumption that all propositions in Y , being a subset of
J, are majority-accepted.
An important special case of this combinatorial condition is the condition of value
restriction (Dietrich and List 2010a), which can be shown to generalize the equally named
classic condition in the context of preference aggregation (Sen 1966). A pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn)
is called value-restricted if every minimally inconsistent subset Y ￿ X contains a pair of
propositions p, q not jointly accepted by any individual, i.e., for all i 2 N, fp;qg * Ji.
Again, this is enough to rule out that any minimally inconsistent set Y ￿ X can be
majority-accepted: if it were, then each of the propositions p;q 2 Y from the de￿nition of
value restriction would be majority-accepted and thus at least one individual i 2 N would
accept both, contradicting value restriction. Several other domain restriction conditions
are discussed in Dietrich and List (2010a).
How plausible is the strategy of avoiding the impossibility of non-degenerate judgment
aggregation via restricting the domain of admissible inputs to the aggregation rule? The
answer to this question depends on the group, context and decision problem at stake. As
already noted, di⁄erent groups exhibit di⁄erent levels of pluralism, and it is an empirical
question whether or not any of the identi￿ed combinatorial conditions are met by the
empirically occurring pro￿les of individual judgment sets in any given real-world case.
Some groups may be naturally homogeneous and lined up along a one-dimensional ide-
ological or cognitive spectrum. Consider, for example, societies with a strong tradition
of a conventional ideological left-right polarization. Other societies or groups may not
exhibit such a structure, and yet through group deliberation or other forms of commu-
nication they may be able to achieve su¢ ciently ￿ cohesive￿individual judgments, which
meet conditions such as unidimensional alignment or value restriction. In discussions of
10Or the middle two individuals, if n is even.
11Or the intersection of the judgments of the middle two individuals, if n is even.
12Similarly, if n is even, the intersection of the individually consistent judgment sets of the middle two
individuals is still a consistent set of propositions.
17the relationship between social choice theory and the theory of deliberative democracy,
the existence of mechanisms along these lines has been suggested (Miller 1992, Knight
and Johnson 1994, Dryzek and List 2003). However, the present escape route from the
impossibility is certainly no ￿ one size ￿ts all￿solution.
5.2 Relaxing the output conditions
Like the input condition of universal domain, the output condition of collective rational-
ity occurs in all the impossibility theorems reviewed above. Again the condition seems
prima facie reasonable. First of all, the requirement of consistent collective judgments
is important not only from a pragmatic perspective ￿after all, inconsistent judgments
fail to be action-guiding when it comes to making concrete decisions ￿but also from a
more fundamental philosophical one. As argued by Pettit (2001), collective consistency
is essential for the contestability and justi￿ability of collective decisions (for critical dis-
cussions of this point, see also Kornhauser and Sager 2004 and List 2006). Secondly,
the requirement of complete collective judgments, too, is pragmatically important. In
many cases ￿and perhaps even by de￿nition ￿the agenda consists precisely of those
propositions that require actual adjudication; and if this is so, the formation of complete
collective judgments on them is essential.
Nonetheless, the case for collective consistency is arguably stronger than that for
collective completeness. There are now several papers in the literature that discuss re-
laxations of completeness (e.g., List and Pettit 2002; G￿rdenfors 2006; Dietrich and List
2007b,d, 2008a; Dokow and Holzman 2010b). G￿rdenfors (2006), for instance, criticizes
completeness as a ￿ strong and unnatural assumption￿ . However, not every relaxation of
completeness is enough to avoid the impossibility of non-degenerate judgment aggrega-
tion. As shown by G￿rdenfors (2006) for a particular class of agendas (so-called atomless
agendas) and subsequently generalized by Dietrich and List (2008a) and Dokow and
Holzman (2010b), if the collective completeness requirement is weakened to a deductive
closure requirement, then the other conditions reviewed above restrict the possible aggre-
gation rules to so-called oligarchic ones. Deductive closure requires that any proposition
p in X that is logically entailed by other accepted propositions be also accepted, i.e.,
if J ‘ p, then p 2 J. An aggregation rule is oligarchic if there exists an antecedently
￿xed non-empty subset M ￿ N ￿ the oligarchs ￿ such that the collective judgment
set is always the intersection of the individual judgment sets of the oligarchs, formally
F(J1;:::;Jn) =
T
i2M
Ji. A dictatorial aggregation rule is the limiting case in which the set
of oligarchs M is singleton. In fact, a table very similar to Table 3 above can be derived
in which the output condition is relaxed to the conjunction of consistency and deductive
closure and the right-most column is extended to the class of oligarchic aggregation rules
(Dietrich and List 2008a).
(Readers who wish to go back to the proof of Theorem 3a above can verify that if
collective rationality is weakened to collective consistency and deductive closure, with all
other conditions remaining as before, then all claims except the last one still go through.
The weakened rationality requirement is strong enough for the arguments for claims 1 to
4 to continue to work, sometimes with minor adjustments. Claim 5, however, must be
modi￿ed. While the intersection of all winning coalitions continues to be winning and
non-empty, it need not be singleton any longer. Instead, it is a non-empty but possibly
18non-singleton set M ￿ N such that, for any C ￿ N, C 2 C if and only if M ￿ C. This
establishes the impossibility part of the main theorems in Dietrich and List 2008a and
Dokow and Holzman 2010b. As before, the proof can be adjusted to derive the oligarchy
analogues of the impossibility parts of Theorems 2a,b and 3b as well.)
If collective rationality is weakened further, namely to consistency alone, more promis-
ing possibilities open up. Groups may then use supermajority rules according to which
any proposition on the agenda is collectively accepted if and only if it is accepted by a
certain supermajority of individuals, such as more than two thirds, three quarters, or
four ￿fths of them. If the supermajority threshold q 2 (1
2;1]is greater than k￿1
k , where k
is the size of the largest minimally inconsistent subset of the agenda, such rules always
produce consistent (but not generally deductively closed) collective judgments (Dietrich
and List 2007b, extending List and Pettit 2002). To see this, suppose, for a contradic-
tion, that an inconsistent set of propositions is collectively accepted under such a rule.
Then all the propositions in at least one minimally inconsistent subset Y ￿ X, which by
assumption is of size k or smaller, are each accepted by a supermajority of more than
k￿1
k of the individuals. But any k or fewer supermajorities of that size must have at least
one individual in common ￿just as two simple majorities, or three majorities of more
than two thirds, must have at least one individual in common ￿and this individual must
accept all k propositions at once. Given the inconsistency of Y , however, this contradicts
the consistency of the individual￿ s judgments and thus constitutes a violation of universal
domain. In the court and government examples above, we have k = 3, and thus a super-
majority threshold above 2
3 would be su¢ cient for collective consistency. Supermajority
rules, of course, satisfy all the other (input and responsiveness) conditions that I have
reviewed.
Groups with a strongly consensual culture, such as the UN Security Council or the EU
Council of Ministers, may well adopt this supermajoritarian approach to solving judgment
aggregation problems. The price they have to pay for avoiding the impossibility of non-
degenerate judgment aggregation in this manner is the risk of stalemate. Small minorities
are able to veto judgments on any propositions. Furthermore, when both individual and
collective judgment sets are only required to be consistent but neither complete nor
deductively closed, a recent impossibility theorem suggests that an asymmetry in the
criteria for accepting and for rejecting propositions is a necessary condition for avoiding
dictatorial aggregation rules (Dietrich and List 2007d). As in the case of the earlier
escape route ￿via relaxing universal domain ￿the present route is no ￿ one size ￿ts all￿
solution to the problem of judgment aggregation.
5.3 Relaxing the responsiveness conditions
Arguably, the most compelling escape-route from the impossibility of non-degenerate
judgment aggregation opens up when we relax some of the responsiveness conditions
used in the impossibility theorems. The key condition here is independence, i.e., the ￿rst
part of the systematicity condition, which requires that the collective judgment on each
proposition on the agenda depend only on individual judgments on that proposition,
not on individual judgments on other propositions. The second part of systematicity,
requiring that the criterion for determining the collective judgment on each proposition
be the same across propositions, is already absent from several of the impossibility results,
such as the two parts of Theorem 3, and relaxing it alone is insu¢ cient for avoiding an
19impossibility result in general (especially when the agenda is above a certain level of
complexity).
If we give up independence, however, several promising aggregation rules become
possible. The simplest example is the premise-based rule, which I have already introduced
above. This rule was discussed, originally under the name issue-by-issue voting, by
Kornhauser and Sager (1986) and Kornhauser (1992), and later by Pettit (2001), List and
Pettit (2002), Chapman (2002), Bovens and Rabinowicz (2006), Dietrich (2006) and many
others. As noted, the premise-based rule involves designating a subset Y ￿ X as a set of
premises and generating collective judgments by taking majority votes on all premises and
then deriving the judgments on all other propositions (conclusions) from these majority
judgments on the premises. By construction, the consistency of the resulting collective
judgments is guaranteed, provided the premises are logically independent from each other.
If these premises further constitute a logical basis for the entire agenda ￿i.e., they are not
only logically independent but any assignment of truth-values to them also settles the
truth-values of all other propositions ￿then the premise-based rule also ensures collective
completeness.13 (The conclusion-based rule, by contrast, violates completeness, in so far
as it only ever generates collective judgments on the conclusion(s), by taking majority
votes on them alone.)
The premise-based rule, in turn, is a special case of a sequential priority rule (List
2004). To de￿ne such an aggregation rule, we must specify a particular order of priority
among the propositions in X such that earlier propositions in that order are interpreted
as epistemically (or otherwise) prior to later ones. For each given pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn), the
propositions in X are then considered one-by-one in the speci￿ed order and the collective
judgment on p 2 X is formed as follows. If the majority judgment on p is consistent with
the collective judgments on propositions considered earlier, then that majority judgment
on p becomes the collective judgment on p; but if the majority judgment on p is incon-
sistent with those earlier judgments on other propositions, then the collective judgment
on p is determined by the implications of those earlier judgments. In the example of
Table 2 above, the multi-member government might consider the propositions in the or-
der p, p ! q, q (with negations interspersed) and then accept p and p ! q by majority
voting while accepting q by logical inference. The collective judgment set under such an
aggregation rule is dependent on the speci￿ed order of priority among the propositions.
This property of path dependence can be seen as a virtue or as a vice, depending on the
perspective one takes. On the one hand, it appears to do justice to the fact that proposi-
tions can di⁄er in their status (consider, for example, constitutional propositions versus
propositions of ordinary law), as emphasized by Pettit (2001) and Chapman (2002). But
on the other hand, it makes collective judgments manipulable by an agenda setter who
can in￿ uence the order in which propositions are considered (List 2004), which in turn
echoes a much-discussed worry in social choice theory (e.g., Riker 1982).
Another class of aggregation rules that give up independence ￿the class of distance-
based rules ￿was introduced by Pigozzi (2006), drawing on related work in the area of
13A ￿rst general formulation of a premise-based rule in terms of a subset Y ￿ X interpreted as the set
of premises was given in List and Pettit (2002). Furthermore, as shown by Dietrich (2006), premise-based
rules can be axiomatically characterized in terms of the key condition of independence restricted to Y ,
where Y is the premise-set. In some cases, an impossibility result reoccurs when the preservation of
unanimous individual judgments on non-premises is required, as shown for certain agendas by Mongin￿ s
(2008) theorem mentioned in the previous section. For recent extensions, see Dietrich and Mongin (2010).
20belief merging in computer science (Konieczny and Pino PØrez 2002). Unlike premise-
based or sequential priority rules, these rules are not based on the idea of prioritizing some
propositions over others. Instead, they are based on a distance metric between judgment
sets. We can de￿ne the distance between any two judgment sets J;J0 ￿ X for instance by
counting the number of propositions on the agenda on which they disagree, i.e., d(J;J0) =
jfp 2 X : p 2 J < p 2 J0gj. (This particular metric d is called the Hamming distance.)
A distance-based aggregation rule now assigns to each pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn) a consistent
and complete collective judgment set J that minimizes the sum-total distance from the
individual judgment sets,
P
i2N
d(J;Ji), with some additional stipulation for dealing with
ties. Distance-based aggregation rules have a number of interesting properties. They
capture the idea of reaching a compromise between di⁄erent individuals￿judgment sets.
Further, although they give up independence, they can preserve the spirit of neutrality
across propositions if they are de￿ned in terms of a distance metric such as the Hamming
distance that treats all propositions on the agenda equally.
What is the cost of violating independence? Arguably, the greatest cost is manip-
ulability of the aggregation rule by the submission of insincere individual judgments
(Dietrich and List 2007c). Call an aggregation rule manipulable if there exists at least
one admissible pro￿le (J1;:::;Jn) such that the following is true for at least one indi-
vidual i 2 N and at least one proposition p 2 X: (i) if individual i submits his or her
genuine judgment set Ji, then the collective judgment on p di⁄ers from the individual￿ s
genuine judgment on p, i.e., p 2 F(J1;:::;Jn) < p 2 Ji; (ii) if individual i submits a
strategically adjusted judgment set J0
i, then the collective judgment on p coincides with
the individual￿ s genuine judgment on p (where other individuals￿judgment sets remain
equal), i.e., p 2 F(J1;:::;J0
i;:::Jn) , p 2 Ji. If an aggregation rule is manipulable in this
sense, then individuals may have incentives to misrepresent their judgments.14 To illus-
trate, if the court in the example of Table 1 were to use the premise-based rule, sincere
voting among the judges would lead to a ￿ liable￿verdict, as we have seen. However, if
judge 3 were su¢ ciently strongly opposed to this outcome, he or she could strategically
manipulate the outcome by pretending to believe that q is false, contrary to his or her
sincere judgment; the result would be the majority rejection of q, and consequently a
￿ not liable￿verdict. It can be shown that an aggregation rule is non-manipulable if and
only if it satis￿es the conditions of independence and monotonicity (Dietrich and List
2007c; for closely related results in a more classic social-choice-theoretic framework, see
Nehring and Puppe 2007). Assuming that, other things being equal, the relaxation of
independence is the most promising way to make non-degenerate judgment aggregation
possible, the impossibility theorems reviewed above can therefore be seen as pointing to
a trade-o⁄ between degeneracy of judgment aggregation on the one hand (most notably,
in the form of dictatorship) and its potential manipulability on the other. As in other
branches of social choice theory, a perfect aggregation rule does not exist.
6 The relationship to other aggregation problems
Before concluding, it is useful to consider the relationship between the theory of judg-
ment aggregation and other branches of aggregation theory. I here focus on three related
14The precise relationship between opportunities and incentives for manipulation is discussed in Dietrich
and List (2007c).
21aggregation problems: preference aggregation, abstract aggregation and probability ag-
gregation.
6.1 Preference aggregation
The theory of preference aggregation in the long and established tradition of Condorcet
and Arrow addresses the following question: How can a group of individuals arrive at a
collective preference ordering on some set of alternatives on the basis of the group mem-
bers￿individual preference orderings on them? Condorcet￿ s classic paradox illustrates
some of the challenges raised by this problem. Consider a group of individuals seeking to
form collective preferences over three alternatives, x, y and z, where the ￿rst individual
prefers x to y to z, the second y to z to x, and the third z to x to y. In this case, major-
ity voting over pairs of alternatives fails to yield a rational collective preference ordering:
there are majorities for x over y, for y over z, and yet for z over x ￿a preference cycle.
Arrow￿ s theorem (1951/1963) generalizes this observation by showing that, when there
are three or more alternatives, the only aggregation rules that guarantee the avoidance
of cycles and satisfy some other minimal conditions are dictatorial ones. Condorcet￿ s
paradox and Arrow￿ s theorem have inspired a huge literature on axiomatic social choice
theory, a review of which is entirely beyond the scope of this paper.
How is the theory of preference aggregation related to the theory of judgment aggre-
gation? It turns out that preference aggregation problems can be formally represented
within the model of judgment aggregation, as presented here. The idea is that preference
orderings can be represented as sets of accepted preference ranking propositions of the
form ￿ x is preferable to y￿ , ￿ y is preferable to z￿ , and so on.
To construct this representation formally (following Dietrich and List 2007a, extend-
ing List and Pettit 2004), it is necessary to employ a specially devised predicate logic
with two or more constants representing alternatives, denoted x, y, z and so on, and a
two-place predicate ￿ _is preferable to_￿ . To capture the standard rationality conditions
on preferences (such as asymmetry, transitivity and connectedness), we de￿ne a set of
propositions in our predicate logic to be consistent just in case this set is consistent
relative to those rationality conditions. For example, the set fx is preferable to y, y is
preferable to zg is consistent, while the set fx is preferable to y, y is preferable to z, z is
preferable to xg ￿representing a preference cycle ￿is not. The agenda X is then de￿ned
as the set of all propositions of the form ￿ v is preferable to w￿and their negations, where
v and w are distinct alternatives among x, y, z and so on. Now each consistent and
complete judgment set on X uniquely represents a rational (i.e., asymmetric, transitive
and connected) preference ordering. For instance, the judgment set fx is preferable to y,
y is preferable to z, x is preferable to zg uniquely represents the preference ordering that
ranks x above y above z. Furthermore, a judgment aggregation rule on X uniquely repre-
sents an Arrovian preference aggregation rule, i.e., a function from pro￿les of individual
preference orderings to collective preference orderings.
Under this construction, Condorcet￿ s paradox of cyclical majority preferences becomes
a special case of the problem of majority inconsistency discussed in section 2 above.
To see this, notice that the judgment sets of the three individuals in the example of
Condorcet￿ s paradox are as shown in Table 7. Given these individual judgments, the
majority judgments are indeed inconsistent, as the set of propositions accepted by a
majority is inconsistent relative to the rationality condition of transitivity.
22x is preferable to y y is preferable to z x is preferable to z
Individual 1
(x ￿ y ￿ z)
True True True
Individual 2
(y ￿ z ￿ x)
False True False
Individual 3
(z ￿ x ￿ y)
True False False
Majority True True False
Table 7: Condorcet￿ s paradox translated into jugdment aggregation
More generally, when there are three or more alternatives, the agenda X, as just de-
￿ned, has all the combinatorial properties introduced in the discussion of the impossibility
theorems above (i.e., non-simplicity, even-number-negatability, and total blockedness /
path-connectedness), and thus those theorems apply to the case of preference aggre-
gation. In particular, the only aggregation rules satisfying universal domain, collective
rationality, independence and unanimity preservation are dictatorships (Dietrich and List
2007a, Dokow and Holzman 2010a; for a similar result with the additional condition of
monotonicity, see Nehring 2003). This is precisely Arrow￿ s classic impossibility theo-
rem for strict preferences: the conditions of universal domain and collective rationality
correspond to Arrow￿ s equally named conditions, independence corresponds to Arrow￿ s
independence of irrelevant alternatives, and unanimity preservation, ￿nally, corresponds
to Arrow￿ s weak Pareto principle.
6.2 Abstract aggregation
The problem of judgment aggregation is closely related to the problem of abstract ag-
gregation ￿rst formulated by Wilson (1975) (in the binary version discussed here) and
later generalized by Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) (in a non-binary version). In re-
cent work, the problem has been discussed by Dokow and Holzman (2010a) and in a
slightly di⁄erent formulation (the property space formulation) by Nehring and Puppe
(2002, 2010). As before, let me begin by stating the key question: How can a group of
individuals arrive at a collective vector of yes/no evaluations over a set of binary issues
on the basis of the group members￿individual evaluations over them, subject to some
feasibility constraints? Suppose there are multiple binary issues on which a positive (1) or
negative (0) view is to be taken. An ￿ evaluation vector￿over these issues is an assignment
of 0s and 1s to them. Let Z ￿ f0;1gk be the set of evaluation vectors deemed feasible,
where k is the total number of issues. Now an abstract aggregation rule is a function that
maps each pro￿le of individual evaluation vectors in a given domain of feasible ones to a
collective evaluation vector. To represent Kornhauser and Sager￿ s court example in this
model, we introduce three issues, corresponding to propositions p, q and r, and de￿ne
the set of feasible evaluation vectors to be Z = f(0;0;0);(0;1;0);(1;0;0);(1;1;1)g, i.e.,
the set of 0/1 assignments that respect the doctrinal constraint whereby positive evalu-
ations on the ￿rst two issues (corresponding to p and q) are necessary and su¢ cient for
a positive evaluation on the third one (corresponding to r). More generally, a judgment
aggregation problem can be represented in the abstract aggregation model by de￿ning
the set of feasible evaluation vectors to be the set of admissible truth-value assignments
23to the unnegated propositions on the agenda. The problem of majoritarian inconsistency
then reemerges as a failure of issue-wise majority voting to preserve feasibility from the
individual to the collective level.
As discussed in List and Puppe (2009), the model of abstract aggregation is informa-
tionally sparser than the logic-based model of judgment aggregation. To see that translat-
ing judgment aggregation problems into abstract ones involves some informational loss,
notice that very di⁄erent agendas (and thereby very di⁄erent decision problems) can
give rise to the same set of feasible evaluation vectors. For example, the set of feasible
evaluation vectors resulting from the agenda containing p, p $ q, p ^ q (and negations),
without any doctrinal constraint, coincides with that resulting from the agenda in the
court example ￿namely Z as just de￿ned ￿although syntactically and interpretationally
those agendas are very di⁄erent from each other.
The abstract aggregation model is arguably at its strongest when our primary interest
lies in how the existence of non-degenerate aggregation rules depends on the nature of the
feasibility constraints, as opposed to the particular syntactic structure or interpretation
of the underlying propositions. Indeed, the agenda characterization theorems reviewed
above have their intellectual origins in the literature on abstract aggregation (and here
particularly in Nehring and Puppe 2002, 2010 and subsequently in Dokow and Holzman
2010a). When the logical formulation of a decision problem is to be made explicit, or
when the rationality constraints on judgments (and their possible relaxations) are to be
analyzed using logical concepts, on the other hand, the logic-based model of judgment
aggregation seems more natural.
6.3 Probability aggregation
In the theory of probability aggregation, ￿nally, the focus is not on making consistent
acceptance/rejection judgments on the propositions of interest, but rather on arriving at
a coherent probability assignment to them (e.g., McConway 1981, Genest and Zidek 1986,
Mongin 1995). Thus the central question is: How can a group of individuals arrive at a
collective probability assignment to a given set of propositions on the basis of the group
members￿individual probability assignments, while preserving probabilistic coherence
(i.e., the satisfaction of the standard axioms of probability theory)? This problem is
quite general. In a number of decision-making settings, the aim is not so much to come
up with acceptance/rejection judgments on certain propositions but rather to arrive at
probabilistic information about the degree of belief we are entitled to assign to them or
the likelihood of the events they refer to.
Interestingly, the move from a binary to a probabilistic setting opens up some non-
degenerate possibilities of aggregation that do not exist in the standard case of judgment
aggregation. A key insight is that probabilistic coherence is preserved under linear av-
eraging of probability assignments. In other words, if each individual coherently assigns
probabilities to a given set of propositions X, then any weighted linear average of these
probability assignments across individuals still constitutes an overall coherent probability
assignment on X. Moreover, it is easy to see that this method of aggregation satis￿es the
analogues of all the input, output and responsiveness conditions introduced above: i.e., it
accepts all possible pro￿les of coherent individual probability assignments as input, pro-
duces a coherent collective probability assignment as output and satis￿es the analogues
of systematicy and unanimity preservation; it also satis￿es anonymity if all individuals
24are given equal weight in the averaging. A classic theorem by McConway (1981) shows
that, if the set of propositions X on which probabilities are to be assigned is isomorphic
to a Boolean algebra with more than four elements, linear averaging is uniquely char-
acterized by an independence condition, a unanimity preservation condition as well as
the analogues of universal domain and collective rationality. Recently, Dietrich and List
(2008b) have obtained a generalization of this theorem for a much larger class of agendas
(essentially, the analogue of non-simple agendas). A challenge for the future is to obtain
even more general theorems that yield both standard results on judgment aggregation
and interesting characterizations of salient probability aggregation methods as special
cases (for some ideas on how to move towards a general theory of propositional attitude
aggregation, see Dietrich and List 2010b).
7 Concluding remarks
The aim of this paper has been to give a brief introductory review of the theory of
judgment aggregation. My focus has been on central ideas and questions of the theory
and a few illustrative results. Inevitably, many important results and promising research
directions have been omitted (for surveys, see, for example, List and Puppe 2009 and
a special issue of the Journal of Economic Theory on ￿ Judgment aggregation￿in 2010).
In particular, the bulk of this paper has focused on judgment aggregation in accordance
with a systematicity or independence condition that forces the aggregation to take place
in a propositionwise manner. Arguably, some of the most interesting open questions in
the theory of judgment aggregation concern the relaxation of this propositionwise restric-
tion and the move towards other, potentially more ￿ holistic￿notions of responsiveness.
Without the restriction to propositionwise aggregation, the space of possibilities grows
dramatically, and I have here reviewed only a few examples of aggregation rules that
become possible, namely premise-based, sequential priority and distance-based ones.
To provide a more systematic perspective on those possibilities, Dietrich (2007b) has
recently introduced a general condition of independence of irrelevant information, de￿ned
in terms of a relation of informational relevance between propositions. An aggregation
rule satis￿es this condition just in case the collective judgment on each proposition de-
pends only on individual judgments on propositions that are deemed relevant to it. In
the classical case of propositionwise aggregation, each proposition is deemed relevant only
to itself. In the case of a premise-based rule, by contrast, premises are deemed relevant
to conclusions, while each premise is only relevant to itself; and in the case of a sequen-
tial priority rule, the relevance relation is given by a linear order of priority among the
propositions. Important future research questions concern the precise interplay between
the logical structure of the agenda, the relevance relation and the conditions on aggrega-
tion rules in determining the space of possibilities. A key question is to what extent the
quest for non-degenerate judgment aggregation rules requires us to move away from local,
propositionwise aggregation to holistic aggregation in which the collective judgment on
each proposition may depend on individual judgments on entire ￿ webs￿of other relevant
logically connected propositions.
A further research direction considers the idea of decisiveness rights in the context
of judgment aggregation, following Sen￿ s classic work (1970) on the liberal paradox. In
judgment aggregation, it is particularly interesting to investigate the role of experts and
25the question of whether we can arrive at consistent collective judgments when giving
di⁄erent individuals di⁄erent weights depending on their expertise on the propositions
in question. Some existing impossibility results (Dietrich and List 2008c) highlight the
di¢ culties that can result from such deference to experts, but many open questions
remain.
Finally, as in other areas of social choice theory, there is much research to be done
on the relationship between aggregative and deliberative modes of decision-making. In
many realistic settings, decision-makers do not merely mechanically aggregate their votes
or judgments, but they exchange and share information, communicate with each other
and update their beliefs. Some authors have begun to consider possible connections
between the theory of judgment aggregation and the theory of belief revision (e.g., Pettit
2006, List 2011, Dietrich 2010, Pivato 2008). But much of this terrain is still unexplored.
My hope is that this review will contribute to stimulating further research.
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